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1 Introduction 
Some welfare properties of price cap regulation have been recently analyzed by a 
number of papers that, especially during the first decade of the current 
millennium, moved from the seminal contribution of Vogelsang and Finsinger 
(1979), to analyze the price cap’s ability to guarantee welfare maximization, 
welfare improvements and/or poverty reduction (Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini, 2002; 
Valentini, 2006; Makdissi and Wodon, 2007). These papers contributed to the 
extant  literature by extending some familiar results on price cap regulation in 
frameworks where efficiency and equity issues can be dealt with simultaneously. 
As we will see, there is a strong parallelism between the price cap results that will 
be surveyed in this paper and those originating from the well-established theories 
on optimal indirect taxation and tax reforms, as well as public pricing. As a matter 
of fact, it is well known that many standard results on optimal taxation and tax 
reforms have a straightforward counterpart in the monopoly pricing context and 
the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule represents the most obvious and well known 
example of this connection. This sort of parallelism started with the contributions 
of Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956) and it has gone on with Diamond and 
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Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) and Feldstein (1972) - who proposed the optimal 
structure of, respectively, indirect taxation and public pricing when distributional 
concerns are accounted for in the social welfare function -, Ahamad and Stern 
(1984) and Ross (1984) – who proposed, independently but almost 
contemporaneously, an identical method to infer social welfare weights from, 
respectively, indirect taxation and regulated prices - and so on for the subsequent 
contributions in these research fields. What is less acknowledged, maybe even by 
many regulatory economists, is that this parallelism exists also with respect to a 
number of properties that characterize some types of price cap regulation. This 
paper reviews the economic literature that explored such properties, showing that 
the links between optimal taxation, optimal pricing and price cap mechanisms go 
beyond the well-known adjustment process of price capped prices towards 
Ramsey prices firstly proposed by Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) and further 
analyzed by Brennan (1989).  
This paper deals with the normative properties of price cap regulation but it has 
no pretension to deliver an exhaustive survey of the articles in this area where 
most of the literature is concerned with price cap’s efficiency properties from a 
productive point of view. Most of the papers that, especially during the 80’s and 
the 90’s, studied price caps also from a social welfare perspective (Bradley and 
Price, 1988; Neu, 1993; Cowan, 1995,  among the others) refer, explicitly or 
implicitly, to Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) and to the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing 
rule as the benchmark for their welfare evaluations. In all these papers, however, 
the normative analysis is neither based on ethical judgments on the utilitarian 
welfare function that underlines Ramsey prices, nor on the distributional 
consequences of its implementation, which are, in contrast, the issues 
characterizing the papers reviewed in this survey.  
Other surveys on price cap regulation have been published in the last years. For 
instance, both Sappington (2002), who reviews the theoretical and  practical 
characteristics of the various incentive regulatory plans that have been mostly 
used in telecommunications markets, and Armstrong and Sappington (2005), who 
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provide a review of the most influential theoretical work on the design of 
regulatory policy, devote several pages on the design of price cap regulation. 
Vogelsang (2002) and Sappington and Weisman, (2010), instead, report very 
detailed and critical reviews of price cap regulation in the experience of its 
applications in, respectively, public utility and, more specifically, 
telecommunications industries. However, to the best of our knowledge, no other 
paper has ever attempted to give a unified vision of the literature reviewed in the 
present survey. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review very briefly some 
important contributions in the field of optimal public pricing and indirect taxation 
in order to highlight the strong correspondence between the results of these two 
strands of literature. As we will see in the following sections, this correspondence 
can be extended also to the theory of price cap regulation. In section 3, indeed, we 
start from the Feldstein generalization of the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule in order 
to show how an ad hoc generalization of the traditional Laspeyres-type price cap 
can guarantee second best prices that can incorporate distributional concerns on 
consumers. Also, we will see that, given this more general formulation of price 
cap, it can be possible to rescue the regulator preferences over different groups of 
consumers from the implemented price cap formula. The final part of section 3 
shows what are the  sufficient conditions guaranteeing that a marginal price cap 
reform is welfare improving and the necessary and sufficient conditions 
guaranteeing that it is poverty reducing. We will stress that these assessments are 
not contingent on any given social welfare function. Finally, section 4 concludes 
and points out the possible future researches in this area.  
 
2 A short tour of indirect taxation and public pricing  
Since the pioneering articles of Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956), some 
hundreds of paper have contributed, more or less independently, to add insight to 
the theories of indirect taxation and public pricing. As both the original Ramsey 
problem and its application to monopolistic markets deal with how prices should 
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depart from marginal costs in order to maximize social welfare subject to a 
constraint (tax revenue in Ramsey,  profit in Boiteux), it is not surprising that any 
result obtained in the taxation context has its equal in public pricing and 
viceversa. So, Feldstein (1972) extended the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule and 
proposed the optimal structure of public pricing for the case when the social 
welfare function accounts for distributional concerns; in the same spirit, Diamond 
(1975) developed the analysis of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) to derive a many-
person Ramsey tax rule which enables to take into account the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity objectives.  
 
2.1 Optimal indirect taxation vs. optimal pricing 
To give an analytic synthesis of these strands of literature we may consider the 
following individualistic social welfare function 
 )],(...),,([),( 1
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where p is the price vector faced by any of the H households, y is the vector of the 
households’ incomes, ),( h
h yv p  is the indirect utility function of household h 
(h=1,…H), with yh which is the income of household h. Now, if we assume that 
tsp  , where s  is the vector of producers’ prices and t  the vector of specific 
taxes, we can formulate the optimal taxation problem as  
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where  is the Lagrange multiplier. We further assume that this vector exists and 
is unique for any level of tax revenue T  in (2). 
The optimal taxation problem is essentially equivalent to the following  
maximization problem 
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where the main difference is in the nature of the constraint that in (4) represents a 
minimum level of profits,  , that must be guaranteed to a multi-product monopolist 
that produces I goods in order to maximize profits given by  (p) = 
))(()( pqp cqp
i
ii  . We let q(p) be the I-dimensional vector whose elements are 
the market demand functions qi(p) (i = 1, .., I) which are assumed to be 
continuous and downward sloping, and c(q) denoting production costs which are 
assumed to be continuously differentiable in qi, for any i = 1, .., I. Now the price 
vector ) .., ,( **1 Mppp  that solves problem (4) is implicitly given by the I + 1 
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where   is the Lagrange multiplier.  
It is straightforward to show that conditions defined in (3) are exactly equivalent 
to those defined in (5) as long as we limit problem (2) to the case of constant 
return to scale. Indeed, under constant return to scale s is constant and we can 
interpret the problem of selecting a tax structure as equivalent to choosing a 
structure of consumer prices (Sandmo, 1976). 
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2.2 The Ramsey- Boiteux condition  
To provide a convenient interpretation of (3) and (5), we consider the further 
assumptions that i) for any given pair of goods i,j=1,…I, ij, there is no demand 
cross elasticity and ii) W(p,y) is defined as the simple sum the quasi-linear 
indirect utility functions of the H individuals purchasing the I goods, that is  
W(p,y) = h
H
h
h
H
h
hh yuyv  
 11
)()( pp,     (6) 
Quasi-linear indirect utility function implies that the Roy’s identity takes the form 
vh/pi=-qi h, for any h= 1, …H , and any i= 1, …I (see for instance Varian, 1992 
or Mas Colell et al., 1995) so that  
*
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Under these assumptions the first order conditions defined by both (3) and (5) 
imply the well-known Ramsey-Boiteux condition 
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where i  and j  are the demand elasticity of good i w.r.t. pi and the demand 
elasticity of good j w.r.t. pj, respectively, and ii cp *  (i=1,…I) can be seen as the 
optimal departure from marginal costs either in terms of taxation (i.e.  iii cpt  **  
when we limit problem (2) to the case of constant return to scale) or in terms of 
monopoly pricing. 
Condition (8) provides an operational rule telling us that when the demand 
elasticity of one good is higher than the demand elasticity of another good, the 
distance from the marginal cost should be less for the former than for the latter.  
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2.3 Distributional issues 
Several authors (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972 and Feldstein, 1972 among the 
others), however, noticed that the Ramsey-Boiteux condition may imply conflict 
between allocative efficiency and distributional objectives. Typically, 
commodities with low price elasticity are necessities while those with high 
elasticity are luxuries. Then condition (8) might imply that necessities should be 
taxed at higher rates than luxuries which may result undesirable from the 
distributional point of view since, typically, necessities represent a large share of 
expenditure for lower income consumers. This undesirable result, however, 
depends on the characterization of the social welfare function given in (6): the 
choice of a simple sum of quasi-linear indirect utility functions implies that the 
social welfare weight attached to any household is always the same or, 
equivalently, that the consumer side of the economy can be treated as if there 
were just one representative household. 
Therefore, in order to extend the analysis to a many person economy and to 
combine both distribution and allocation, we follow Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
and go back to the more general individualistic social welfare function defined in 
(1). Differentiating (1) w.r.t. pi we obtain 

 



 H
h i
h
hi p
v
v
W
p
W
1
),( yp       (9) 
where, by the Roy’s identity, hhi
i
h q
p
v ,
 , for any h= 1, …H , and any i= 1, …I 
and 
h
h
h y
v

  is the marginal utility of income of consumer h. Therefore, we can 
rewrite (9) as 



 H
h
hih
i
q
p
W
1
,
)( yp,       (9’) 
 8
where h
h
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  is the marginal social utility of income, or social welfare 
weight, of consumer h. We can use (9’) to rewrite conditions (3) and (5), 
respectively, as follow: 
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2.4 The Feldstein optimal structure of public prices  
The many household optimal taxation problem derived by Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) is formally equivalent to the less general framework used by Feldstein 
(1972) who tackles with an optimal public pricing problem in a multi-product 
context where the social planner aims at maximizing a welfare function expressed 
as weighted sum of the households’ consumer surpluses. Formally, we can define 
(1) as  
h
hh yuSW )(')();( pyp  and  restate (11) as  
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where Sh(p) is the consumer surplus of household h, with )(
)(
, ihi
i
h pq
p
S 
 p , y is 
the H-dimensional vector of households’ income, yh is household’s h income, and 
u(yh) is the marginal social utility due to a small increase in the income of 
household h. Under standard assumptions on the shape of u(yh) (u’>0 and u’’<0), 
the use of  u as welfare weights implies that society values more a marginal 
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increase in utility by a low-income household than an equal increase for a high-
income household. To make easier the comparison between the Ramsey-Boiteux 
conditions and those derived under Feldstein’s (and Diamond and Mirrlees’) 
model it is useful to define 
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as the distributional characteristic of the good i. Ri is a weighted average of the 
marginal social utilities, where each household’s marginal social utility is 
weighted by the quantity of good i consumed by that household. The conventional 
welfare assumption that u’(y)<0 implies that the value of Ri will be greater for 
goods that take a larger share of the budget of households with lower income 
(necessities) than for goods that take a larger share of the budget of high income 
households (luxuries). 
In particular, when i denotes the own-price elasticity of good i and 0
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any i, j = 1, .., I and i  j, we can get  
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which corresponds to Feldstein’s equation (9) (see Feldstein, 1972, p 34) and can 
be easily compared to the Ramsey-Boiteux condition defined above by (8). Also 
condition (13) provides an operational rule telling us how we must depart from 
the Ramsey-Boiteux condition when RiRj, that is when goods differ for their 
distributional characteristics.  
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2.5 Marginal commodity tax and price reforms  
Feldstein (1976) and most of the following literature shifted the emphasis from 
optimal commodity tax design to marginal commodity tax reforms. Marginal 
commodity tax reforms have been investigated by Ahamad and Stern (1984) as a 
viable approach to evaluate empirically a tax system. This approach consists in a 
specification of the economy and its initial equilibrium, together with a social 
welfare function and its welfare weights, aimed at verifying if social welfare 
improvements can be obtained by marginal tax variations.  
From conditions (3) we get  
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which implies that, when both 
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condition for a marginal commodity tax reform to be welfare improving is that the 
following holds for at least a pair of goods 
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More specifically, 
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cost of taxing commodity i (i.e. the welfare loss caused by a marginal increase in 
ti relative to the corresponding gain caused in the tax revenue) is greater than the 
marginal social cost of taxing commodity j, implying that we could increase social 
welfare without reducing the tax revenue (or, alternatively, increase the tax 
revenue without reducing the social welfare) by increasing tj and decreasing ti.. 
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For an exhaustive and updated survey of the existing literature on marginal 
commodity tax reforms we refer to Santoro (2007) who also stresses the related 
theoretical limitations and implementation issues. Here, instead, we are more 
interested in showing how easily we can replicate the Ahamad and Stern’s idea of 
marginal tax reforms to a pricing context characterized by multi-product 
monopoly (Coady, 2006).  
As a matter of fact, condition (5) implies 
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Therefore. the sufficient condition for a welfare improving marginal price reform 
is 
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which implies that, as long as 
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 , we could increase 
social welfare without reducing profits (or, alternatively, increase profits without 
reducing the social welfare) by increasing pj and decreasing pi.  
 
2.6 The inverse optimum problem  
It could be argued that the existence of social welfare improvements depends on 
the social welfare function that has been chosen at first. Even if the initial 
equilibrium taxes and/or prices admit welfare improvements for a specific social 
welfare function it is still possible that those taxes and/or prices are an optimum 
for another social welfare function. Under this respect one could evaluate a tax 
system from a different perspective aimed at finding out “whether there is a set of 
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value judgements [i.e. a set of welfare weights] under which, given the model of 
the economy, the initial state of affairs would be deemed as optimum. That is the 
inverse optimum problem. The value judgements may then be used in a number of 
ways. One might infer that these are indeed the value judgements of the 
government and use them in appraising other decisions. Or if the computed value 
judgements were seen as objectionable, then they could be employed to criticise 
the existing state of affairs. in the sense that it could be seen as optimum only with 
respect to disagreeable values” (Ahamad and Stern, 1984, p. 259). 
Almost contemporaneously, but independently, both Ahamad and Stern (1984) and 
Ross (1984) proposed an easy procedure to extract social welfare weights from the 
existing tax and price structure, respectively. For an optimal indirect taxation 
problem, we can compact the system of I equations reported in the second line of 
(10) in the following way  
'' TQβ          (18) 
where , Q and T are, respectively, the transpose of the (Hx1) vector of social 
welfare weights with hth element h, the (HxI) consumption matrix with hith 
element qi,h, and the transpose of the (Ix1) vector with ith element *
it
T

 . The 
inverse optimum problem (IOP) consists in finding out the vector  that satisfies 
(18). When I=H, the solution of the IOP is 
1''  QTβ         (19) 
where Q-1 is the inverse of Q and, as in Ahmad and Stern (1984), we conveniently 
set λ= 1. The IOP of an equivalent optimal public pricing problem can be easily 
defined along the same lines in terms of  finding out the vector  that satisfies 
'' ΠQβ  , where  is the transpose of the (Ix1) vector with *
ip
  being the ith 
element. The solution in this case is 
1Q'β'          (19’) 
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2.7 Welfare improving and poverty reducing marginal price reforms 
Ahamad and Stern (1984) recognise that their theory of marginal commodity tax 
reforms relies on specific, and possibly controversial, social welfare functions. 
For this reason they suggest also an alternative approach aimed at discovering 
possible Pareto-improving tax reforms. Even if the Paretian approach avoids 
normative value judgements, it is nonetheless of little practical importance since it 
would require that no household is negatively affected by the reform. On this 
motivation Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) generalize Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) 
and propose an intermediate approach based on the Daltonian principle. 
According to this principle, a tax reform improves social welfare if, given a prior 
social ranking of households, it redistributes from high-ranking to low-ranking 
households (let say from a rich to a poor), without reverting the initial ranking. As 
a matter of fact, assume that the only information on the social welfare function is 
that, for any pair of households Hkh ,...1,   )( kh  kh    whenever kh yy  . 
We can define a marginal increase in welfare as a positive weighted sum of 
variations of equivalent income, that is 
0dd
1
 

H
h
hh yW         (20) 
where hyd  is the variation of equivalent income of household h, that is the 
variation of income that in terms of household’s h utility is equivalent to the 
variation of prices. Since we can rewrite (20) as 
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and since 0H  and 1 hh  , then a sufficient condition for a marginal 
increase in welfare is 0d
1

 k
h
k
y  for any k=1,…H. Of course this framework 
applies to both a commodity tax and a public monopoly context since the 
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variation of prices causing an equivalent variation hyd  to household h can be due 
to both tax and pricing policy.  
Within this stream of literature some scholars have extended the analysis even 
further by considering marginal indirect tax and pricing reforms as a possible 
poverty-reducing instrument (see, for instance, Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991, 
Makdissi and Wodon, 2002 and Liberati, 2003) in a framework that can also 
include higher order classes of  ethical judgments that the Daltonian principle 
used in Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) (see also Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon, 
2008). 
We follow most of this literature and define  f(y) as the density function of income 
],0[ maxyy , pR as a (1xI) vector of reference prices that can be used to asses the 
consumers’ welfare in the presence of prices’ variations, yE(y,p,pR) as the 
equivalent income function that, for any level of y, provides consumers who face 
the reference prices pR with the same level of utility that they would yield if they 
faced p, i.e.  
 ),()),,,(( pppp yvyyv RRE  .     (21) 
We still consider a setting where H households consume I goods but, for 
expositional reasons, we refer only to price variations. Indeed, when prices are 
under the direct control of the social planner, the results obtained for the impact 
on poverty and social welfare of balanced budget marginal price reforms are 
similar to that for the impact of indirect tax reforms (Makdissi and Wodon, 2007). 
Consider first the standard problem of a social planner aiming at increasing 
welfare. We deal with welfare indices defined by utilitarian social welfare 
functions  
 
max
0
)()),,((
y
RE dyyfyyuU pp      (22) 
such that sU   (s=1,2,…), where the classes s  is defined as 
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  siforyuCyuU EiisEs ,...2,10)()1(),()( )(1   .  (23) 
where Cs() is the set of continuous function that are s-time differentiable over 
+. Within this framework we can give a specific normative interpretation to 
every class s . First of all, for any s1, social welfare indices are Paretian, that is 
they weakly increase (i.e. u(i)(yE)o) when an individual’s income increases, and 
obey to symmetry (or anonymity) axiom, that is interchanging any two 
individuals’ incomes does not modify the social welfare indices. Moreover, when 
s2, social welfare indices are concave and respect the Daltonian principle of 
transfer. When s3, social welfare increases if, provided that the variance of the 
distribution does not increase,  an adverse Daltonian transfer in the upper part of 
the distribution is accompanied by a beneficial Daltonian transfer within the lower 
part of the distribution. Further interpretations for higher classes of welfare 
indices are also possible (see Fishburn and Willig, 1984) but are not discussed 
here. 
A very similar setting can be used for the case of a social planner whose task is to 
reduce poverty. As a matter of fact, a poverty index can be thought as a social 
welfare index censored at a poverty line (Duclos and Makdissi, 2004), hence we 
can express poverty indices as 
  max0 )()),,,(()( y RE dyyfzyyzP pp     (22’) 
where P(z) is an additive poverty index, z is the poverty line that, for the sake of 
convenience, is assumed to be defined in the equivalent income space, and 
)),,,(( zyy RE pp  is the contribution to total poverty of a consumer with an 
equivalent income yE≤z. We consider the classes of poverty indices szP )(  
defined as 
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where )(ˆ zC s is the set of function that are s-time piecewise differentiable over 
[0,z] with respect of yE and the normative meaning of classes Ψs(z) is basically the 
same of  s . A fundamental instrument to compare alternative distributions of 
incomes in terms of poverty indices of classes Ψs(z) is the stochastic dominance 
curve (see, for instance, Davidson and Duclos, 2000) that, when p=pR, can be 
written as 
    
z ss dyyfyz
s
zD
0
)1( )(
!1
1)( .     (24)  
It is possible to show (see Duclos and Makdissi, 2004) that, for any sU  , a 
sufficient condition for Ub-Ua≥0, that is for improving welfare by moving from 
the relative density functions fa  to fb, is 
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s
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s
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s
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   (25) 
Analogously, for any   zz ,0  and any szP )( , a sufficient and necessary 
condition for Pb(z)-Pa(z)≤0, that is for reducing poverty by moving from the 
relative density functions fa  to fb, is 
  zyyDyD sbsa anyfor0)()( .     (25’) 
However, when we want to assess how a given income distribution is affected by 
a marginal price reform we need to consider how stochastic dominance curves are 
affected by such reforms and deal with normalized consumption dominance 
curves which are defined as 
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where 
k
s
s
k p
zDzCD 
 )()(  is the consumption dominance curve of good k (k=1, …, 
I), and 
H
qk )(p  is the normalizing factor which is the reciprocal of the average 
consumption of that good. 
The impact on the stochastic dominance curve of a marginal price reform that 
keeps the firm’s profit constant is, by definition, 
 

 I
i
i
s
i
s dpzCDzdD
1
)()(       (27) 
that, in the simpler case of a marginal price reform that decreases the price of 
good i, increases the price of good j, can be shown (Makdissi and Wodon, 2007) 
to be equal to 
 1
)()()()( dp
H
qzCDzCDzdD i
s
j
s
i
s p

       (27’) 
where 
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p
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i
j
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q
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By (25) and (27’) we can show that, for any sU  ,   
 
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 (28) 
is a sufficient condition for increasing U when we marginally decreases the price 
of good i and increases the price of good j in order to keep the firm’s profit 
constant. 
Similarly, by (25’) and (27’) we can show that, for any szP )( ,   
  zyyCDyCD sjsi ,0anyfor0)()(    (28’) 
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is a necessary and sufficient condition for increasing P(z) when we marginally 
decreases the price of good i and increases the price of good j in order to keep the 
firm’s profit constant. 
In the next section we will see how Makdissi and Wodon (2007) extend these 
results to the context where the social planner has not prices under her direct 
control and she has to rely on price cap regulations.   
 
3 The normative analysis of price cap regulation: allocative efficiency, 
distributional and poverty issues 
Price cap is a regulatory instrument typically used to control the dynamic of prices 
in utility markets which are characterized by some degree of market power. If the 
regulated market is a multi-product monopoly and the regulator is a benevolent 
social welfare maximizer, her objective can be still represented as the problem we 
have already outlined in (4). The regulator’s possibility of solving that 
maximization problem depends greatly on her knowledge of demand and cost 
functions. In fact, almost any form of regulation is characterized by asymmetric 
information where the less informed part is supposed to be the regulator who 
cannot directly observe either some behaviour by the firm - usually the level of 
effort put to reduce costs - or the realisation of some stochastic parameter 
generally regarding the structure of cost and/or demand. On the other hand, the 
regulated firm knows these parameters but does not have incentives to truthfully 
report them or to behave in accordance with the regulator’s wishes. 
Price cap regulation represents a useful instrument which is easy to implement 
and allows to bypass the regulatory problems due to asymmetric information. As a 
matter of fact, price cap is a non-Bayesian regulatory instrument in the sense that 
the regulator can implement and enforce the contract with no need of having prior 
information - even in probabilistic terms – on the unobservable parameters of the 
problem. In fact, in multi period contexts price cap regulation can be designed as 
a routine that allows to enforce socially efficient prices (at least in the long run). 
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Moreover, price cap regulation belongs to fixed-price contracts (i.e. the regulated 
firm has no chance to affect the cap on its prices) that always guarantee  
productive efficiency because the firm is residual claimant of any possible gain 
due to its effort of reducing costs. 
  
3.1 Price cap regulation and Ramsey-Boiteux prices: the Vogelsang and 
Finsinger mechanism 
Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) first highlighted that a Laspeyres-type price cap 
can be structured as an incentive mechanism which enforces the use of Ramsey-
Boiteux prices by a multiproduct monopolist.  
Suppose the regulatory maximization problem is that defined in (4) where the 
welfare function is defined as the simple sum the quasi-linear indirect utility 
functions of the H individuals purchasing the I goods and, therefore, (6) and (7) 
apply. Let pt be the I-dimensional vector of market prices at time t, where t = 0, .. 
,  and assume the regulated monopolist myopically maximises its profits (pt) = 
))(()( t
i
t
i
t
i cqp pqp   in each period of time t, where c(q(pt)) is the cost 
function at period t when the firm fixes a vector of prices pt and sells the 
corresponding vector of quantities q(pt). The cost function has the same properties 
discussed in section 2 for the single period case and it is also assumed to show 
decreasing ray average cost, that is c(q) c(q) for any  1. Both cost and 
demand functions are supposed to be stable over time while myopia implies that 
the regulated firm does not maximise any discounted flow of future profits, 
disregarding the effects that its choice at any time t may have on the problem it 
has to face in the subsequent periods. The regulator does not know neither the 
demand functions nor the cost function. Nevertheless, in any period t, the 
regulator can observe both the total cost which has been realised by the firm in the 
previous period and the corresponding vector of sold quantities q(p t-1).  
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Within this framework, Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) suggest a bright 
sequential mechanism, or algorithm, built on a price constraint just exploiting the 
regulator’s capacity to observe those previous period’s realisations. Suppose that 
t=1 is the period of time when the mechanism is implemented for the first time. 
Then, the regulatory constraint requires that the vector of prices chosen by the 
firm at any period t must satisfy the following inequality: 
q(p t-1) p t -c(q(p t-1))0.      (29) 
In words, the pseudo-revenue given by multiplying the previous period’s vector of 
quantities by the current vector of prices cannot exceed the total cost occurred to 
the firm at time t-1. Then, if we start with positive profit at t=0, (29) requires that 
p1 cannot be equal to p0 and, in general, pt cannot be equal to pt-1 until the zero 
profit contingency takes place. Furthermore, positive profit at t=0 and decreasing 
ray average cost causes (29) to induce t0 for any subsequent period. Indeed, as 
prices go down, profits tendency to decrease is partially balanced by the 
assumption of decreasing average cost. As a matter of fact, as prices go down, 
quantities go up and decreasing average cost assures that unit costs go down. 
Under the above assumptions, it can be also shown that, whenever t-1 is positive, 
(29) guarantees W(pt) W(pt-1) and the sequence of the price vector pt 
converges to a long run stationary equilibrium where social welfare is maximized 
under the   =0 constraint.  
Here we provide a graphical intuition of these results for the simpler single 
product case. When I=1, the constraint (29) becomes q(pt-1) pt-c(q(pt-1))0 
which implies 
)(
))((
1
1


 t
t
t
pq
pqcp        (29’) 
that is the price chosen by the firm at time t cannot be higher that the average 
costs at time t-1. The assumption of decreasing (ray) average cost implies the 
following figure: 
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Let t=1 be the first period when the price cap (29’) comes into force and be p0 and 
q0 the profit maximizing price and quantity pair: then, according to (29’), p1 is the 
highest level of price – equal to the firm’s average costs at time 0 – that the firm 
will charge at time 1 and q1 will be the corresponding level of quantity that will be 
produced and supplied. Given q1, p2 is the highest level of price – equal to the 
firm’s average costs at time 1 – that the firm will charge at time 2 and so on till 
the stationary point where average costs and demand cross each other. This 
converging process depends on the assumption of decreasing average costs. 
Indeed, under increasing (ray) average costs either the process converges to 
second best prices with profits and losses following each other in a hog cycle or, 
if the average cost curve is steeper than the demand curve (in absolute terms) the 
process does not converge and some further steps must be added to the basic 
regulatory algorithm consisting in the regulator imposing (29) whenever firm’s 
profits where positive in the previous period (see the flow chart II at figure 8, p. 
169 of Vogelsang and Finsinger, 1979).  
The price cap formula proposed by Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) has some 
similarity with the RPI-X price cap first introduced in 1984 for regulating British 
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Telecom (Littlechild, 1983) and then adopted in many other markets and countries 
(OECD, 2000). The RPI-X constraint is a limit over the increase of a Laspeyres 
price index, that is 
X
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where RPI 
t
 is the retail price index at period t and X is an exogenous adjustment 
factor aimed at inducing productivity improvements over time. This formula can 
be rewritten, and it is usually presented, as a RPI-X threshold to a weighted 
average of the prices’ changes over time 
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where the weights are the firm’s revenue shares calculated at period t-1. This RPI-
X is essentially similar to the V-F mechanism given in (29) that can be rewritten 
as 
)())()0))() 111111   ttttttt cc pq(pq(ppq(pq(pp  
in order to obtain 
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Indeed, if we allow for an inflationary element in costs, (31) is the same as the 
tariff basket RPI-X approach with X varying from period to period according to 
the size of profits (see also Bradley and Price, 1988). The Laspeyres type price 
caps’ property of converging towards Ramsey-Boiteux prices is also showed by 
Brennan (1989) for a further simplified version of (31) where the second term on 
the right-hand side is set equal to zero. 
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3.2 Distributional issues of RPI-X regulation and the Generalized Price Cap  
As we have seen is section 2.3, there may exist some possible adverse 
distributional effects of Ramsey-Boiteux prices since they entail higher mark-ups 
on those goods with lower demand elasticity which, in turn, often represent a 
large share of low-income consumers’ expenditures. There have been a number of 
papers (see, for instance, Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995 and 1998) that have 
questioned the desirability of the so-called process of tariff re-balancing 
undertaken by many price capped utilities. This process has entailed a sharp rise 
in the price of items with low price elasticity and a decrease in the price of items 
whose demand is more sensitive to price changes with a largely documented 
regressive effect. 
This widespread concern led Oftel (the former regulator of the 
telecommunications industry in the UK) to modify in 1997 the RPI-X formula that 
had been used since 1984 to regulate the prices set by British Telecom. Basically, 
Oftel shifted from a typical Laspeyres type price cap as in (30’) to a new price cap 
formula where different weights were chosen for price changes of the different 
goods included in the regulated bundle. These weights were no longer the revenue 
shares for the previous period but the shares of total revenues accruing to the 
regulated firm only from those consumers who are in the first eight deciles of total 
expenditure in telecommunications services. This new price cap formula implied 
that a stricter control was placed on the prices of the goods that make up a large 
share of the typical bill of low-consumption customers. Formally, indicating by iq
  
the quantity of good i purchased by consumers who are in the first eight deciles of 
total expenditure in telecommunications services, the price cap formula adopted 
by Oftel can be approximated by the following: 
XRPI
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It is straightforward to show that, if 
11   titi qpW   for some specification of 
y)(p,W , (32) can be related to the generalized price cap (GPC) formula proposed 
by Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini (2002). For the simplified case of RPI=1 and X=0, 
the GPC can be written as 
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When the regulator knows her preferences, she can attach a value to any 
1 tipW  and implement (33). Moreover, if the regulator can observe the prices 
set by the firm in the previous and current periods, she is able to check whether 
the firm is complying with (33) and enforce it.  
Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini (2002) prove that, if the social welfare function 
y)(p,W  is quasi-convex and under the other hypotheses we have already 
discussed in 3.1, the application of a GPC like (33) to a multi-product monopolist 
may guarantee that social welfare does not decrease over time. To show this point 
it is convenient to rewrite the GPC as 
   
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where the direction of the inequality is simply due the negative values of the 
derivatives of the welfare functions. From (33’) it must be 
    0
1
1
1 


I
i i
t
t
i
t
i p
Wpp p  
which, since we are assuming that W(p) is quasi-convex and strictly decreasing in 
prices, implies )()( 1 tt WW pp , that is social welfare is monotonically non-
decreasing in time.  
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In Figure 2 we can see this result in graphical terms. Let 1tW  be the iso-welfare 
curve going through the price vector 1tp . By totally differentiating W(), it is 
straightforward to show that the slope of 1tW  at 1tp  is 1
2
1
1



 t
t
pW
pW
. Note, 
from (33’), that this is also the slope of the GPC constraint imposed on the firm at 
time t. As the prices set by the firm at time t-1 satisfy as an equality the GPC 
constraint at time t, the tangent to 1tW  at 1tp  and the GPC constraint at time t 
are actually the same line. Thus, the GPC restricts the set of feasible prices for the 
firm at time t to those on (or below) a line tangent to the iso-welfare curve going 
through the prices set at time t-1. Because of the quasi-convexity of the welfare 
function, the GPC constraint never lies above the iso-welfare line at t-1. Thus, it 
cannot happen that a vector of prices selected by the firm at time t and satisfying 
the GPC constraint reduces social welfare. 
1tW
1
1
tp
1
2
tp 2p
1p
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B
Figure 2
 
Moreover, Iozzi Poritz and Valentini (2002) show that, under the GPC, the 
sequence of prices chosen by a regulated firm that maximizes profits in each 
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period t converges to a price vector which respects the allocative optimum 
conditions defined in the second line of (5). In other terms, when the regulated 
firm faces a constraint as in (33), the only long run equilibrium is such that the 
firm chooses the price vector which maximizes social welfare, given that the firm 
obtains a specified amount of profits in equilibrium. Here we provide a heuristic 
argument of this sequence convergence, mainly based on graphical interpretation, 
while we refer the interested reader to the original paper for a more rigorous proof 
(see Proposition 2 of Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini, 2002, p. 102). 
First of all, it must be noted that the price vector p*, coming as the result of the 
maximization of social welfare given a constraint on the minimum profit level, 
can also be obtained as the solution to the dual problem of maximizing firm’s 
profits under a constraint of a minimum level of welfare. Note also that the GPC 
can be seen as a linear approximation of the constraint on the welfare when this is 
fixed at the level W(pt-1). In a two-goods case (see again Figure 2) this 
observation implies that in any period the GPC can be seen as the line tangent to 
the iso-welfare contour at the prices set in the previous period. Therefore, in any 
period t, the regulated monopolist chooses its optimal price vector pt such that the 
upper contour set ( pt) is tangent to the GPC constraint. Since the GPC 
corresponds to the slope of the welfare function at pt-1 prices, two alternative 
possibilities can occur. The first possibility is that pt is not equal to pt-1 as it is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Therefore, the GPC constraint at time t+1 (the line A’B’) is 
different from the GPC constraint at time t (the line AB), implying that the 
process of convergence is not finished yet and the level of social welfare is still 
increasing over time.  
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The second possibility, instead, is that pt is equal to pt-1 which implies that the 
GPC will not move in the following period (i.e. the convergence is concluded) 
and the iso-profit and the iso-welfare are tangent to each other at pt, which is 
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exactly what the constrained welfare maximisation requires. This alternative 
situation is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini (2002) provide a description of the properties of price 
cap regulatory schemes under very general hypothesis on the structure of the 
regulator’s preferences. Their result then can be interpreted as a generalisation of 
Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) and Brennan (1989) where the convergence to 
Ramsey-Boiteux prices is optimal as long as the welfare function is strictly 
utilitarian (i.e. when it is an un-weighted sum of the individuals’ welfare).  
Since the only restriction on the welfare function which it is required in Iozzi, 
Poritz and Valentini (2002) is that it is quasi-convex, we can assert that the GPC 
is able to guarantee a long run equilibrium with optimal prices for almost any 
welfare function; hence, when the welfare function is strictly utilitarian and 
consumers have quasi-linear preferences, i
i
q
p
W 
 , for all i = 1, .. , I, and the 
GPC simply takes the form of the Laspeyres-type price cap studied by Brennan 
(1989).  
Similarly, the GPC can be accommodated to provide a specification which is 
suitable for the case of distributionally weighted utilitarian preferences. Indeed, 
when the regulator’s preferences can be represented by the following welfare 
function   
h
hh yuSW )(')();( pyp , we can show that the GPC defined by (33’) 
can guarantee the convergence of the prices set by the regulated firm to the 
optimal prices as defined by condition (11’), provided that the (33’) takes the 
following characterization 
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with 1tiR  which is the distributional characteristic of the good i  at time t as it is 
defined in (12). Then 1~ tiq  is an adjusted measure of the aggregate consumption of 
good i at time t-1, which entails that the quantities consumed by each individual 
are adjusted using the marginal social utility of income of that individual. 
It is quite easy to prove that when the GPC takes the form (32), social welfare can 
never decrease in time, and the sequence of price vectors {pt} which come as the 
solution of the firm’s maximization problem converges to a unique vector which 
satisfies the first order conditions of problem (4) for the special case when, as in 
Feldstein (1972),  
h
hh yuSW )(')();( pyp . Indeed,  
h
hh yuS )(')(p  is a strictly 
decreasing function in prices which respects the required properties of 
continuously differentiability and quasi-convexity. Moreover, the constraint in 
(34) is identical to the GPC that has been defined in (33’) since, from (35) and 
from the fact that )()( , ihi
i
h pq
p
S 
 p , we have 1
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It is straightforward to see that 11 ~   titi qq , that is the specification of the GPC 
given in (32) as representation of the price cap formula implemented by Oftel in 
1997 is equal to the specification given in (34), as long as the social welfare 
weights (that in the case of  
h
hh yuSW )(')();( pyp  are the social marginal 
utility of income, )(' hyu ) are one for households belonging to the first eight 
deciles of expenditure,  and zero otherwise. 
 
3.3 Uncovering social welfare weights under price cap regulation  
Valentini (2006) extends the analysis of Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini (2002) and 
explores the possibility of adapting the framework suggested by Ross (1984) in 
order to detect the implicit welfare weights of a regulator who is implementing a 
GPC. Since in Ross (1984) prices are directly chosen by the regulator, they 
exactly reveal the regulator’s preferences over consumers, and the strategy of 
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inverting a “generic” Ramsey formula with potentially diverse welfare weights 
may be usefully followed. Under price cap regulation, instead, the observed prices 
might be not optimal since they eventually converge to the second best in the long 
run. However, if we assume that the regulator’s maximization problem is given as 
in (4), that is, 
 )(   t.s.
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and the price cap rule is given by 
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we can try to get information on W(p,y) at any time t by simply observing the 
vector  of the weights used in (36). Indeed, the price cap rule defined in (36) has 
the same properties of a the Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini’s GPC defined by (33) as 
long as  
1 t
i
t
i p
W

     for any i=1,…I.     (37) 
We can adapt (9’) to the present context by rewriting it as 
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where 1,
t
hiq  is the quantity of good i consumed by consumer h at time t-1 
and h
h
h v
W  
  is again the marginal social utility of income (that is the social 
welfare weight) of consumer h. Therefore, as long as at any time t we can observe 
the weight ti  and the quantities of good i consumed by each consumer h=1,…H  
at time t-1, (38) allows to uncover h , conditional on all the other k  (k=1,…,h-
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1,h+1,….H),. More precisely, we can write the system of I equations given by 
(38) as 
βQW  tt         (39) 
where Wt is the )1( I  vector whose ith element is 1

t
ip
W , Qt is the (IxH) non-
singular matrix whose i,hth element is t hiq ,  and  is the (Hx1) vector of social 
welfare weights whose hth element is h. 
In this framework, the inverse optimum problem (IOP) consists in finding out the 
vector  that satisfies (39). When I=H, the solution of the IOP problem is 
tWQβ  1         (40) 
where Q-1 is the inverse of Qt.   
 
3.4 Welfare improving and poverty reducing marginal price cap reforms 
We can extend the analysis on welfare improving and poverty reducing marginal 
price reforms to  the case where the social planner has not prices under her direct 
control and she relies on price cap regulation (Makdissi and Wodon, 2007). Let us 
assume, as usual, that the regulated monopolist chooses p in order to maximize its 
profit П given a static version of price cap (see, for instance, Armstrong and 
Vickers, 1991 and 1993) which is given by 
 ppi
I
i
i 
1
 .        (41) 
where the regulator’s choice of i reflects her social preferences. For instance, 
when the weights i are set equal to the realized quantities (i.e. i=qi for any i=1, 
…, I), then the profit maximization problem yields to Ramsey-Boiteux prices that 
imply a regulator who aims to maximize a strictly (i.e. unweighted) utilitarian 
social welfare function. Given (41), the first order conditions of the monopolist’s 
problem are 
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where v is the Lagrange multiplier.  
In this setting we define a marginal price cap reform as a reform that affects the 
weights of two prices in the price cap basket by increasing i and decreasing j in 
such a way that di =-dj . However, differently from the case of direct price 
reform, where just the prices of two goods change, any di may imply that the 
regulated firm adjusts its whole price structure and changes all prices. As a matter 
of fact, by totally differentiating the set of equations given by (42), we get that, 
for any i=1, …, I,  
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         (43) 
We know from section 2.7 (see eq. (27)) that the impact on the stochastic 
dominance curve of a marginal change of prices is given by 
 

 I
i
i
s
i
s dpzCDzdD
1
)()( .      (44) 
In the present setting we can rewrite (44) as 
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that, taking into account that i =-dj , becomes 

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
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
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i
j
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i
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h
s dppzCDzdD
1
)()(      (45’) 
Equation (45’) allows to identify the sufficient condition for a marginal price cap 
reform being welfare improving for any welfare index sU  , namely 
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and the necessary and sufficient condition for a marginal price cap reform being 
poverty reducing for any poverty index szP )( , namely 
 







 zyppyCDI
h j
h
i
hs
h ,0anyfor0)(
1  .   (46’) 
The main difference between the conditions implied by (46) and (46’) and those 
obtained in the case of marginal price reforms [i.e. (28) and (28’)] is that the 
former relies on CD curves of all goods while the latter on only 
s
iCD  and 
s
jCD . 
This is due to the effect of cross-price elasticities in (43). In fact, if we assume 
that the cross-price elasticities of goods are zero, (43) can be written as 
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and  
  zypyCDpyCD jjsjiisi ,0anyfor0)()(       (47’) 
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respectively. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This paper provides a unified vision of several results that appeared in the three 
streams of literature that, almost independently from each others,  have analyzed a 
number of welfare properties arising under indirect taxation, public pricing and 
price cap regulation. 
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